Private & public sector management
Horne Smelter: Can a City Council Vote Create Social Acceptability?
· 7 min read

On February 3, 2026, Glencore suspended the investments planned for the Horne Smelter in Rouyn-Noranda: $1 billion, including $300 million to reduce emissions (Rolland, 2026). Without that work, the plant would no longer meet government standards as of March 2027 (Rolland, 2026). Two days later, Quebec said it was prepared to grant seven years of regulatory predictability on two conditions: that the company invest and that the City take a position on social acceptability (Cabinet du premier ministre, 2026). City council gave its support on February 9 (Morasse, 2026, p. 2). On June 11, the National Assembly passed Bill 11: the interim arsenic target was pushed back by about two years and the ministerial authorization was extended to 2033 (Cotnoir, 2026). The Horne Smelter then confirmed that it was investing the $300 million (Cotnoir, 2026).
Read quickly, the sequence looks like a successful negotiation. Read through the lens of stakeholder mobilization, it raises another question: who produced the social acceptability, and who made use of it?
One number, two perimeters
Quebec's standard for arsenic in ambient air is 3 ng/m³. The 2023 authorization set 45 ng/m³ for 2024, then 15 ng/m³ starting in 2027 (Rolland, 2026). That target of 15 is based on a reference value that protects the most vulnerable from non-cancer effects, without replacing the standard (Institut national de santé publique du Québec, 2022). The 2026 debate was about the timetable for this interim target. The plan to reach the standard, expected in December 2027, was postponed to December 2032 (Brousseau-Pouliot, 2026).
The scale of measurement matters as much as the threshold. Gaudreau Lavoie and Boily (2025, p. 23) show that multiple territorial boundaries complicate the mobilization of partners and make it risky to compare data drawn from different perimeters. The case illustrates this. In April, the Horne Smelter reported 40.9 ng/m³ at the legal monitoring station, but 15 ng/m³ or less across 96% of the urban area (Fonderie Horne, 2026). One measurement, two perimeters, two narratives.
A city without a seat at the table
Divay and Paquin (2013, p. 2) associate governance with interactions among multiple actors, and the multilevel dimension with hierarchically ordered decision-making bodies. On the vertical axis, Quebec holds the authorization. The City does not sit at the negotiating table and considers that it had no choice but to take a position (Grenier, 2026, p. 3). Young (2013, p. 26) notes that their constitutional dependence has earned municipalities the cliché of "creatures of the provinces," while crediting them with integrated local information and ties to organized local interests. That is precisely the asset Quebec is asking for.
On the horizontal axis, Glencore dominates. Eshuis et al. (2014, p. 157) note that interdependence gives actors veto power over strategic measures. Here, the veto takes the form of a possible exit. In 2025, according to the mayor, the parent company had requested a closure plan in order to assess its costs (M.-C. Bergeron, 2025), and the company let the threat hang in February 2026 (P. Bergeron, 2026). Equating this threat with the veto described by Eshuis et al. is a reading of the case. The authors do not address such a situation.
Bryson (2004, p. 31) proposes crossing stakeholders' power and interest to identify the power bases that must be taken into account and the coalitions to be encouraged. Applied here, the exercise is harsh on the local level, and this ranking remains an interpretation. Glencore and Quebec combine high power and high interest. The City, highly interested, carries little weight. The unions have members they can mobilize: the CSN represents 600 workers (Lévesque, 2026), and the Syndicat des Métallos, the steelworkers' union, sees the 15 ng/m³ target as a reasonable compromise (Rolland, 2026). The group Mères au front considers the thresholds dangerous (Blais, 2026). The regional public health directorate believes the risk is underestimated (P. Bergeron, 2026), while Quebec did not seek the opinion of public health authorities on the extension (M.-C. Bergeron & Gervais, 2026). Ottawa, called upon by the unions (Rolland, 2026) and then by Glencore, had not confirmed any participation as of June (Cotnoir, 2026).
From municipal vote to provincial argument
For Barca et al. (2012, p. 147), the knowledge needed for a territorial policy must emerge from a participatory and deliberative process bringing together local and external actors. That process requires conditionalities, meaning binding commitments between partners, and a debate open to dissent (Barca et al., 2012, p. 148).
On February 9, amid applause and boos, the mayor announced a decision already made by majority; more than two hours of comments from citizens followed (Morasse, 2026, p. 2). A column in La Presse describes a council that decided behind closed doors, without debate with citizens (Brousseau-Pouliot, 2026). The two accounts agree on one point: the decision came before citizens spoke. What took place looks like information.
The City's demands nevertheless have the form of conditionalities: 15 ng/m³ by 2030, a buffer zone, penalties, and a $100 million trust guaranteeing the $300 million investment (Grenier, 2026, p. 3). The deadline adopted in June, 2029-2030, matches the first (Cotnoir, 2026). Nothing in the documents consulted indicates that the trust or the penalties were retained.
Three objects follow one another. Legault assigned municipal elected officials the responsibility to "confirm the social acceptability of the smelter's emission standard" (Cabinet du premier ministre, 2026). Council supported a proposal for a regulatory delay (Grenier, 2026, p. 3), which the mayor tied to reaching 15 ng/m³ (Morasse, 2026, p. 2). On March 26, Minister Boulet reinterpreted that vote: "The City of Rouyn-Noranda confirmed that it was compatible" (P. Bergeron, 2026). In June, Minister Bernard did the same: "the City gave its agreement to move forward" (Cotnoir, 2026). The delay that was voted on becomes an attested acceptability.
The mayor himself rejects the equivalence. In favour of the decision on substance, he states that a council vote "is not my definition of social acceptability" (Brousseau-Pouliot, 2026). The City's electoral legitimacy thus seems to change hands: the government invokes it at every stage. The City produced it. Quebec uses it.
Emotions are left without an outlet. Eshuis et al. (2014, p. 170) observe that environmental decisions readily arouse strong emotions, a register often set aside in participatory processes (Eshuis et al., 2014, p. 171). The CSN speaks of worried workers and threatens further mobilizations (Lévesque, 2026). Mères au front denounces a balance in which "our children's health" would weigh less than the interests of a multinational (M.-C. Bergeron & Gervais, 2026). Council heard these emotions without any mechanism to integrate them.
The arena shifts
Rouse et al. (2025, p. 398) criticize classic analyses for their static view, whereas the relative importance of stakeholders varies from one stage to the next. In February, Glencore, Quebec and the City held the stage. In March, Québec solidaire and Minister Charette clashed in the National Assembly (P. Bergeron, 2026). In June, the law was passed; Mères au front said it was angry, the Métallos welcomed the move (Cotnoir, 2026). In September, the election campaign brought Mères au front face to face with the Parti québécois leader, who promised to respect the compromise (Blais, 2026). On October 5, Diane Dallaire, former mayor of Rouyn-Noranda, took the riding from the Coalition avenir Québec under the Parti québécois banner (Millette, 2026). Nothing yet indicates what this shift will change.
What cannot be decreed
The main challenge is to turn a social acceptability demanded by Quebec and attested by a municipal vote into credible local support, when the City charged with producing it controls neither the terms of the agreement, nor Glencore's investments, nor the measurement that would make it possible to verify the effects.
Adam-Ledunois and Mansuy (2019, p. 64) describe as a rational myth the idea of decreeing a collective dynamic independently of its context, and conclude that collaboration cannot be "summoned" (Adam-Ledunois & Mansuy, 2019, p. 65). Their article deals with another sector and another country. The mechanism nonetheless appears transferable: four days separate Quebec's request from the municipal vote.
Trust is lacking. In March, Councillor Grenier described it as eroded with respect to Glencore and called for clear timelines (Grenier, 2026, p. 3). In June, the mayor considered that it had to be rebuilt and promised to keep a close watch on the company (Cotnoir, 2026). The indicator does not help. The 15 ng/m³ target slips from 2027 (Rolland, 2026) to 2029-2030 (Cotnoir, 2026), and the plan to reach the 3 ng/m³ standard, from 2027 to 2032 (Brousseau-Pouliot, 2026). The law set the dates. Nothing indicates that it produced support, which remains dependent on the word of actors the City does not command.
Analysis current as of October 5, 2026. Quotations from French-language sources are translated by the author.
(The author)

Strategy, Digital and AI Consultant
Trained in political science (from an honours bachelor's to a master's at Université de Montréal), I'm now completing a graduate diploma (DESS) in private- and public-sector management at HEC Montréal.
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